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Abstract
In this Article, we show that, in contrast to the Commission’s balancing approach in Microsoft,
the ECJ’s narrow construction of the obligation to license IP under Article 82 of the EC Treaty
is based on sound economics and constitutes appropriate public policy. The set of “exceptional
circumstances” listed in Magill and IMS Health constitutes a reasonable implementation of the
optimal legal standard for the assessment of refusals to licence IP: modified per se legality. In the
IP context, an obligation to make property available is a requirement for compulsory licensing. The
ECJ test limits compulsory licensing to those situations in which the prospective social benefits
of licensing are large, while the negative effects of reducing the incentives to innovate are small.
The ECJ test ensures that intervention is restricted to cases where the intervention is still likely
to increase social welfare. The Commission’s test in Microsoft, being a balancing test, does not.
As noted by Professor Gerardin, “balancing ex ante vs. ex post efficiencies is obviously a very
difficult process, which even the most sophisticated economists may find daunting. The risk of
mistaken decisions is therefore high.”
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I. INTRODUCTION
The European Court of Justice ("ECJ") has established in
two prominent cases - Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) & Independent
Television Publications Ltd. (ITP) v. Commission("Magill")' and IMS
Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. ADC Health GmbH & Co. KG ("IMS
Health") - that a refusal to license an intellectual property
("IP") right by a dominant firm constitutes an abuse in "excep-
tional circumstances."' A refusal to license is abusive if: (a) the
requested IP is indispensable to compete; (b) the undertaking
which requested the license intends to offer products or services
not offered by the IP owner and for which there is potential con-
sumer demand; (c) the refusal is such as to reserve to the IP
owner a secondary market by eliminating all competition on that
market; and (d) the refusal is not justified by objective consider-
ations.4 In Microsoft,5 the European Commission appears to have
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1. Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, [1995] E.C.R. 1-743 [hereinafter Magill]
(upholding Commission Decision No. 89/205/EEC, O.J. L 78/43 (1989)); Radio
Telefis Eireann v. Comm'n, Case T-69/89 [1991] E.C.R. 11-485; Indep. Television
Publ'ns Ltd. v. Comm'n, Case T-76/89 [1991] E.C.R. 11-575).
2. Case C-418/01, [2004] E.C.R. _ (ECJ Apr. 29, 2004) (2004 ECJ CELEX LEXIS
192) [hereinafter IMS Health].
3. See id. 35.
4. See id. 52. The extent to which conditions are necessary or sufficient will be
discussed in Parts II and V below.
5. Commission Decision No. COMP/C-3/37.792/EEC (Eur. Comm'n Mar. 24,
2004) [hereinafter Microsoft Decision].
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adopted a different standard - one where licensing is man-
dated if: (1) the requested IP is "necessary" for a competitor to
"viably stay in the market;" (2) the refusal represents a reduction
in "the level of disclosures;" (3) "there is a risk of elimination of
competition" in the secondary market; (4) the refusal to supply
"has the consequence of stifling innovation in the impacted mar-
ket;" and (5) the refusal is not objectively justified because "on
balance" the possible negative impact of an order to supply on
the dominant firm's incentives to innovate is outweighed by its
positive impact on the level of innovation of the whole industry.6
In this Article, we show that, in contrast to the Commis-
sion's balancing approach in Microsoft, the ECJ's narrow con-
struction of the obligation to license IP under Article 82 of the
EC Treaty is based on sound economics and constitutes appro-
priate public policy. The set of "exceptional circumstances"
listed in Magill and IMS Health constitutes a reasonable imple-
mentation of the optimal legal standard for the assessment of
refusals to licence IP: modified per se legality.7 In the IP context,
an obligation to make property available is a requirement for
compulsory licensing. The ECJ test limits compulsory licensing
to those situations in which the prospective social benefits of li-
censing are large, while the negative effects of reducing the in-
centives to innovate are small. The ECJ test ensures that inter-
vention is restricted to cases where the intervention is still likely
to increase social welfare. The Commission's test in Microsoft, be-
ing a balancing test, does not. As noted by Professor Gerardin,
"balancing ex ante vs. ex post efficiencies is obviously a very diffi-
cult process, which even the most sophisticated economists may
find daunting. The risk of mistaken decisions is therefore
high."8
The protection of IP and the struggle against the unlawful
exercise of a dominant position serve complementary purposes:
striking a balance between ex ante incentives for innovation (dy-
6. See id. 779-84.
7. See David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, Designing Antitrust Rules for Assessing Unilat-
eral Practices: A Neo-Chicago Approach, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 73 (2005).
8. Damien Geradin, Limiting the Scope of Article 82 of the EC Treaty: What Can the EU
Learn from the U.S. Supreme Court's Judgment in Trinko in the Wake of Microsoft, IMS, and
Deutsche Telekom ?, COMMON MKT. L. Rev. (forthcoming Dec. 2005) (manuscript at 20-
21, on file with author). See also Derek Ridyard, Compulsory Access Under EC Competition
Law - A New Doctrine of "Convenient Facilities" and the Case for Price Regulation, 2004 Eug.
COMPETITION L. REv. 669, 770 (2004).
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namic effects) and ex post inefficiencies from the exercise of mar-
ket power (static effects). The pragmatic resolution of this
trade-off is in the first instance the subject of IP law. As Advo-
cate-General Jacobs noted in Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v.
Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG:
Where such exclusive [IP] rights are granted for a limited pe-
riod, that in itself involves a balancing of the interest in free
competition with that of providing an incentive for research
and development and for creativity.
9
But then, when should the antitrust authorities and courts
compel a dominant firm to license its IP? As a matter of eco-
nomics, compulsory licensing should be restricted to those situa-
tions in which the prospective social benefits of licensing are suf-
ficiently large as to offset the negative effects of forced sharing
on the incentives to innovate and create new intellectual prop-
erty. Unfortunately, in practice, it is most often impossible to
balance with any degree of certainty the welfare-increasing and
welfare-decreasing effects of this sort of intervention. A more
pragmatic answer is, therefore, that intervention must be limited
to those circumstances where: (1) the pro-competitive effects (ex
post efficiencies) of compulsory licensing are large; and (2) the
disincentive effects (ex ante inefficiencies) of the obligation to
license are small or non-existent.
Economic theory tells us that the pro-competitive effects of
compulsory licensing are largest when: (a) the requested IP is
indispensable to compete; (b) the refusal to deal causes the com-
plete foreclosure of the market; and (c) the refusal prevents the
emergence of markets for new products for which there is poten-
tially substantial demand. Economic theory also tells us that the
disincentive effects of compulsory licensing are less when the
products to be developed by the licensors are not close substi-
tutes of those of the IP holder. But these are precisely the "ex-
ceptional circumstances" defined by the Court in Magill and IMS
Health: indispensability, complete foreclosure, and the new prod-
uct screen. In those cases, the Court laid out a set of cumulative
9. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v.
Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-7/97, [1998]
E.C.R. 1-7791, 1-7812, 62. See Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, KPN
Telecom BV v. Onafhankelijke Post en Telecommunicatie Autoriteit (OPTA), Case C-
109/03, [2004] E.C.R. -, 39 (ECJ July 14, 2004) (2004 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 548).
1111
1112 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 28:1109
circumstances that are sufficient to conclude that a refusal to
license by a dominant undertaking constitutes abusive behavior:
It is clear from the case-law that, in order for the refusal by an
undertaking which owns a copyright to give access to a prod-
uct or service indispensable for carrying on a particular busi-
ness to be treated as abusive, it is sufficient that three cumula-
tive conditions be satisfied, namely, that that refusal is
preventing the emergence of a new product for which there is
potential consumers demand, that it is unjustified and such as
to exclude any competition on a secondary market.1"
Contrary to the opinion of some commentators who have
chastised the ECJ's new product screen as "problem-
atic," "leading to "undesirable consequences,"12 or lacking "solid
economic foundation,"" we regard it as a fundamental compo-
nent of the ECJ's exceptional circumstances test. In fact, a major
contribution of this Article is to provide an economic framework
for determining whether a product is "new" in the context of the
exceptional circumstances test set out by the ECJ in Magill and
IMS Health. We say a product is "new" for the purposes of the
implementation of the ECJ test if it satisfies a potential demand
by meeting the needs of consumers in ways that existing prod-
ucts fail to do. That is, a new product expands the market at cur-
rent prices by bringing in consumers whose demands were not
previously satisfied. This definition, which is consistent with the
Court's rulings, yields consistent and unambiguous predictions,
and is based on sound economics - follows the logic of the er-
ror-cost framework used in this Article to demonstrate the virtue
of the ECJ's "exceptional circumstances test."
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. In
Part II, we review the relevant EC case law and discuss the ECJ's
"exceptional circumstances test" and the Commission's Microsoft
test for assessing refusals to license IP. In Part III, we present the
decision-theoretic framework used in this Article to assess the
optimality of alternative legal standards for assessing refusals to
license. Part IV briefly summarizes the economics of innovation
and IP protection, and provides the economic basis for identify-
10. IMS Health, [2004] E.C.R. at -, 1 38 (LEXIS) (emphasis added).
11. See, e.g., Geradin, supra note 8 (manuscript at 12).
12. Id. (manuscript at 18).
13. See Ridyard, supra note 8, at 670.
2005] THE "EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES TEST"
ing the appropriate legal standard for assessing refusals to li-
cense. In Part V, we draw on the previous analysis to discuss the
likely welfare implications of the ECJ's "exceptional circum-
stances test" and the Commission's test in Microsoft, respectively.
In Part VI, we move to the other side of the Atlantic to compare
the treatment of refusals to license in the United States and the
European Union. Part VII concludes.
II. THE RELEVANT EC CASE LAW
The ECJ has considered two types of refusal to deal cases.
Some of those cases, such as Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A.
& Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Commission ("Commercial Sol-
vents") ,14 United Brands Co. v. Commission,15 and Centre belge d'6tudes
de march6 - TiMmarketing (CBEM) v. SA Compagnie luxembourgeoise
de tgMdiffusion (CLT) (" Telemarketing'), " involved a failure to con-
tinue to supply an existing customer. The main conclusion from
that strand of cases is that the interruption of previous supplies
may constitute an abuse if: (1) the company holds a dominant
position; (2) the input withheld is indispensable to compete; (3)
the refusal risks eliminating all competition on the part of the
customers whose requests are denied; and (4) there is no objec-
tive justification.17
In a few other cases, such as Volvo v. Veng, 8 Magill,19 Bron-
ner, ° and IMS Health,2 ' the Court considered refusals to allow a
third party to use its intellectual or physical property for the first
time. Overall, the Court has shown significant restraint and def-
erence to the property rights of the dominant enterprise.2 2
From those cases it is clear that: (1) companies, including domi-
14. Joined Cases C-6/73 & C-7/73, [1974] E.C.R. 223.
15. Case C-27/76, [1978] E.C.R. 207.
16. Case C-311/84, [1985] E.C.R. 3261.
17. Opinion of Advocate-General Jacobs, Synetairismos Farmakopoion Aitolias &
Akarnanias (Syfiat) v. Glaxosmithkline AEVE, Case C-53/03, 53-60 (2003) (pending)
[hereinafter Syfiat Opinion].
18. Case 238/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6211.
19. Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, [1995] E.C.R. 1-743.
20. Case C-7/97, [1998] E.C.R. 1-7791, 1-7817.
21. Case C-418/01, Case C-418/01, [2004] E.C.R. - (ECJ Apr. 29, 2004) (2004
ECJ CELEX LEXIS 192).
22. See Syfait Opinion, Case C-53/03 (2003) (pending). Hence EC competition law
distinguishes between a duty to continue to deal (i.e., in cases of an existing customer
relationship) and a duty to deal (i.e., in the absence of an existing customer relation-
ship). The threshold to establish an obligation to continue to deal is significantly lower,
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nant companies, have the right to choose their trading part-
ners;21 (2) dominant companies might in certain narrow circum-
stances be obliged to license their intellectual property;24 and
(3) "any obligation to deal pursuant to Article 82 EC can be es-
tablished only after a close scrutiny of the factual and economic
context, and even then only within somewhat narrow limits. 25
Advocate-General Jacobs has made clear that "a dominant un-
dertaking will be obliged to open up its facilities or license its
intellectual property rights" only if "some exceptional harm to
competition" is shown.2 6
A. Volvo v. Veng
The first ECJ judgment regarding compulsory licensing
under Article 82 of the EC Treaty was Volvo v. Veng. This case
concerned the ability of an after-sales service provider to obtain
patented parts from a manufacturer. The ECJ ruled that the
freedom to refuse to license an IP right was at the core of the
subject matter of the exclusive right and concluded that the re-
fusal to license a protected design, even in return for a reasona-
ble royalty, was not in itself abusive. 27 However, the ECJ did not
adopt a per se legality standard. It took the view that the exercise
of an exclusive IP right could be in breach of competition law if
it involved additional abusive conduct, such as the arbitrary re-
fusal to supply spare parts to independent repairers, the fixing of
prices at an unfair level, or the decision to cease producing spare
parts for a particular car model, even though many cars of that
model were still in circulation.28
even though there is no clear justification for this distinction as a matter of economics.
See id.
23. See id.; see also Opinion of Advocate-General Jacobs, Bronner, [1998] E.C.R. I-
7791.
24. See Syfait Opinion, Case C-53/03 (2003) (pending), 66.
25. Id. 53.
26. Id. 66.
27. See Volvo v. Veng, Case 238/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6211, 6225, 8.
28. See id. at 6225, 9; see also Consorzio Italiano della Componentistica di Ri-
cambio per Autoveicoli v. Regie Nationale des Usines Renault, Case 53/87, [1988]
E.C.R. 6039, 6049, 4, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 265 [hereinafter CICRA] (holding that the
mere fact of obtaining protective rights in respect of designs for spare parts for cars was
not an abuse of a dominant position). Note that the Volvo and C/CRAjudgments were
delivered on the same day. See Volvo, [1988] E.C.R. at 6211; see also CICRA, [1988] E.C.R.
at 6039.
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B. Magill
The ECJ has required compulsory licensing of an IP right
only once, in its 1995 judgment in Magill.29 Broadcasters in the
Republic of Ireland - BBC, RTE, and ITP - each published
weekly television ("TV") guides containing details of their own
TV programs. Magill wanted to publish all TV programs in a
comprehensive weekly TV guide and requested TV listing infor-
mation from the three broadcasters. The broadcasters claimed
their TV listings were protected by copyright and refused to
make the information available." The European Commission
ordered the three broadcasters to provide Magill with the infor-
mation it had requested.31 The Court of First Instance ("CFI")
upheld the Commission's Decision that the three broadcasters
had abused the dominant positions they held on the markets for
their TV program schedules.3 2
The ECJ upheld the CFI judgment. The Court established
that a dominant firm refusing to license its IP engages in abusive
behavior only "in exceptional circumstances."3" The Court re-
garded the circumstances in Magill as sufficiently exceptional.
First, the information was indispensable for the production of a
comprehensive TV program guide covering all the TV channels,
a new type of product for which there was a clear and unsatisfied
consumer demand.34 Second, by refusing to provide essential
information, the TV companies were monopolizing the separate
market for TV program magazines.35 And third, there was no
objective justification for such refusal.36
C. Bronner
While Bronner did not concern the licensing of intellectual
property (but rather the case of a newspaper distribution sys-
tem), the case is nevertheless of overarching importance due to
the seminal opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, which provides
an overall framework for refusal to deal cases and also addresses
29. Magi, Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, [1995] E.C.R. 1-743.
30. See id. at 1-811-12, 7 7-10.
31. See id. at 1-812, 12.
32. See id. at 1-825, 57.
33. See id. at 1-823, 50.
34. Id. at 1-824, 7 52.
35. See id. at 1-824, 56.
36. Id. at 1-824, 55.
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the specific issue of intellectual property. In this case, the Court
was asked to establish the circumstances under which a newspa-
per group (Mediaprint), with a substantial share of the market
for daily newspapers, refusing access to its home-delivery net-
work would engage in abusive conduct. The Court concluded
that such behavior would only be an abuse if it was likely to elimi-
nate all competition in the daily newspaper market, because it
was indispensable to compete in such a market, inasmuch as
there was no actual or potential substitute for that home-delivery
scheme.37
In his opinion, Advocate-General Jacobs recognized that
"the right to choose one's trading partners and freely to dispose
of one's property are generally recognized principles in the laws
of the Member States, in some cases with constitutional status."3"
He noted that incursions on this fundamental right to choose
one's own trading partners "require careful justification.""9 As a
result, any interference with this freedom to contract on the
grounds of competition law required a "careful balancing of con-
flicting considerations. "40 Further, he observed that,
In the long term it is generally pro-competitive and in the
interest of consumers to allow a company to retain for its own
use facilities which it has developed for the purpose of its bus-
iness. For example, if access to a production, purchasing or
distribution facility were allowed too easily there would be no
incentive for a competitor to develop competing facilities.
Thus while competition was increased in the short term it
would be reduced in the long term. Moreover, the incentive
for a dominant undertaking to invest in efficient facilities
would be reduced if its competitors were, upon request, able
to share the benefits. Thus the mere fact that by retaining a
facility for its own use a dominant undertaking retains an ad-
vantage over a competitor cannot justify requiring access to
it.
4 1
According to Advocate-General Jacobs, it was "unsatisfactory
37. See Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeit-
schriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-7/97, [1998] E.C.R. 1-7791, 1-7805-06, 41-
44.
38. Opinion of Advocate-General Jacobs, Bronner, [1998] E.C.R. 1-7791, 1-7811,
56.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1-7811, 57.
41. See id.
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... to focus solely on [a firm's] market power on the upstream
market and conclude that its conduct in reserving to itself the
downstream market is automatically an abuse. '4 2 For him, the
key question was whether the refusal to deal "entail [ed] elimina-
tion or substantial reduction of competition to the detriment of
consumers in both the short and the long term."43 Turning to
the issue of compulsory licensing, Advocate General Jacobs
pointed to the "special circumstances of [the Magill] case which
swung the balance in favor of an obligation to license,"4 4 namely
the "prevent[ion] of a much needed new product" and the dubi-
ous nature of the IP right at stake.4 5
Interpreting Magill in light of Advocate-General Jacob's
Opinion in Bronner suggests that a refusal to license can be
viewed as an abuse of a dominant position and can lead to a
compulsory license as a remedy if in addition to the four gen-
eral conditions in refusal to deal cases,4 6 a refusal to license
would prevent the emergence of a new product for which there
is clear and unsatisfied consumer demand.
D. IMS Health
The issue of compulsory licensing and the precise scope of
the "exceptional circumstances" giving rise to an obligation to
license IP came under further scrutiny recently in IMS Health.47
IMS Health, with input from its client pharmaceutical enter-
prises, developed a sales data method based on a segmentation
of the German territory into 1860 zones or "bricks."4 8 The ad-
42. Id. at 1-7811, 58.
43. Id. at 1-7812, 61.
44. Id. at 1-7812-23, 63.
45. Id.
46. Namely that: (1) the refusal to license would eliminate all competition in the
market for which the license is desired; (2) the market for which the license is desired
differs from the market in which the dominant firm exploits the IP right; (3) the domi-
nant firm has no objective justification for its refusal; and (4) there is no actual or
potential alternative to the IP right in the market for which the license is desired and
the IP right is therefore indispensable for competing in that market. See, e.g., Valentine
Korah, The Interface Between Intellectual Property and Antitrust: The European Experience, 69
ANTTRusT L.J. 801, 815-19 (2001); John Temple Lang, Intellectual Property-Related
Abuses Under Article 82 EC Treaty - New Legal Approaches to New Issues, Presenta-
tion at the Fordham University Annual Conference on International Intellectual Prop-
erty Law and Policy (2003).
47. IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-418/
01, [2004] E.C.R. -, 17 (ECJ Apr. 29, 2004) (2004 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 192).
48. Id. at _, 4 (LEXIS).
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vantage of this "1860 brick structure" was that it enabled sales
data to be reported on the basis of small geographic areas while
ensuring that data protection laws were followed. IMS Health
claimed that the 1860 brick structure was protected by copyright,
and thus resisted attempts by two competitors to break into the
market using the same, or a very similar structure, by bringing
actions against them for infringement of copyright and by refus-
ing to grant them a license.49 The competitors in question al-
leged that IMS Health's refusal to license was an abuse of its
dominant position, with the result that it was impossible for new
competitors to enter or stay in the market.5"
IMS Health landed in Luxembourg in two incarnations.
First, the Commission took up the competitors' cause and found
that IMS Health had abused a dominant position by failing to
license what had become an indispensable industry standard.5"
The Commission took the position that "exceptional circum-
stances" had been established by the fact that the brick structure
had become the defacto industry standard, and that IMS was ex-
cluding all competition from the market by refusing, without ob-
jective justification, to license the structure to competitors.52
According to the Commission (in a decision imposing "in-
terim measures" which required IMS Health to license the struc-
ture to its competitors), it did not have to establish in this case
the prevention of the emergence of a new product to demon-
strate "exceptional circumstances. ' 5' To support this claim, the
Commission cited a judgment by the CFI in Tierd Ladbroke SA v.
Commission, in which the CFI stated that a refusal to supply could
infringe Article 82 where it involved a product or service that was
either essential in that there was no real or potential substitute, or
was a new product whose introduction might be prevented de-
spite potential consumer demand.54
IMS Health appealed and asked the CFI to suspend the in-
terim measures pending judgment in the appeal.5  On this
49. See IMS Health, [2004] E.C.R. at -, 21, 23, 26 (LEXIS).
50. See id. at -, 27 (LEXIS).
51. See Commission Decision No. 01/165/EC, 0.J. L 59/18 (2001) [hereinafter
NDC Health/IMS Health].
52. See id.
53. See id. at 18.
54. Case T-504/93, [1997] E.C.R. 11-923, 11-969, 131-32.
55. See NDC Health/IMS Health, 0.J. L 59/18 (2001).
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point, the President of the CFI ruled in favor of IMS Health and,
while not deciding the ultimate issue, was not sympathetic to the
Commission's view on the merits. 56 He noted that the Commis-
sion's Decision appeared to hinge upon a "non-cumulative inter-
pretation" of the conditions regarded as constituting exceptional
circumstances in Magill, in that it did not consider the appear-
ance of a new product (on a downstream market) to be essential
for the existence of exceptional circumstances.57 It reminded
the Commission that:
The fundamental rationale of copyright is that it affords the
creator of inventive and original works the exclusive right to
exploit such works... thereby ensuring that there is a reward
for the creative effort .... To reduce it to a purely economic
right to receive royalties dilutes the essence of the right and
is, in principle, likely to cause potentially serious and irrepa-
rable harm to the rightholder.58
The President of the Court found that the interim measures
adopted by the Commission - compulsory licensing - imposed
a risk of serious and irreparable harm on IMS Health, and that
in the balancing of interests (IMS Health's property right inter-
ests versus the "public interest" in stronger competition) the in-
terests of IMS Health were paramount, particularly as "it is clear
that the public interest invoked by the Commission . . . relates,
in substance, primarily to the interest of the applicant's competi-
tors."59 The Commission withdrew its decision after it said cer-
tain developments in the case in German courts eliminated its
concerns. 
60
That brings us to the second incarnation of this case. A
German court referred to the ECJ three questions on the inter-
pretation of Article 82 of the EC Treaty in the context of IMS
Health's refusal to license its brick structure to NDC.6 1 In Octo-
ber 2003, Advocate-General Tizzano delivered an advisory opin-
ion that considers several different views on when a refusal to
56. See Order of the President of the Court of First Instance, IMS Health Inc. v.
Commission, Case T-184/01 R, [2001] E.C.R. 11-3193.
57. See id.
58. Id. 11-3249-50, 125.
59. Id. at 11-3257-58, 145.
60. See Commission Press Release, Commission Intervention No Longer Necessary
To Enable NDC Health To Compete with IMS Health, IP/03/1159 (Aug. 13, 2003).
61. See IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-
418/01, [2004] E.C.R. -, (ECJ Apr. 29, 2004) (2004 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 192).
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license IP constitutes an abuse.6 2 While the Advocate-General
took a different approach than the Commission, he also de-
parted somewhat from what some observers, such as Professor
Valentine Korah6" and Dr. John Temple Lang,64 considered to
be the teachings of Magill and Bronner. Advocate-General Tiz-
zano endorsed the view that a refusal to license constitutes an
abuse only in special circumstances, and that those circum-
stances are indeed extreme and cumulative:65 to find abuse, it is
not enough that a license be essential for competing in a secon-
dary market or that the refusal eliminate all competition in that
market.66 One still must weigh the benefits of competition
against the protection of intellectual property and the "eco-
nomic freedom of the owner."6 7 As Advocate General Tizzano
stated:
[T] he balance may in my view come down in favour of the
[protection of free competition] only if the refusal to grant
the licence [sic] prevents the development of the secondary
market to the detriment of consumers. More specifically, I
consider that the refusal to grant a licence [sic] may be
deemed abusive only if the requesting undertaking does not
wish to limit itself essentially to duplicating the goods and ser-
vices already offered on the secondary market by the owner of
the intellectual property right but intends to produce goods
or services of a different nature which, although in competi-
tion with those of the owner of the right, answer specific con-
sumer requirements not satisfied by existing goods or ser-
vices. 6 8
Advocate General Tizzano thus considered that IMS Health's re-
fusal to license could only be considered abusive if it prevented
the emergence of "new" products or services. 69 However, his
62. See Commission, Opinion of Advocate-General Tizzano, IMS Health, [2004]
E.C.R. - (ECJ Oct. 2, 2003) (2003 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 717).
63. See generally Korah, supra note 53.
64. See John Temple Lang, The Application of the Essential Facility Doctrine to
Intellectual Property Rights Under European Competition Law, Presention at the Ecole
des Mines de Paris and University of Califonia at Berkely Antitrust, Patent, and Copy-
right Conference (Jan. 15-16, 2004).
65. See Opinion of Advocate-General Tizzano, IMS Health, [2004] E.C.R at, 66
(LEXIS).
66. See id. at __ 61 (LEXIS).
67. Id. at -, 1 62 (LEXIS).
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. See id. at _, 62-63 (LEXIS).
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view of what might constitute a "new product" in the down-
stream market could be read rather expansively, because taken
literally it could include minor improvements on existing prod-
ucts.
The second incarnation of the IMS Health case in Luxem-
bourg concluded with the judgment of the ECJ on April 29,
2004.7o The Court clearly established that there should be no
obligation to license IP rights unless "two different stages of pro-
duction" can be identified and it is found that "the upstream
product is indispensable in as much as for supply of the down-
stream product."7 The Court considered that a separate market
for IP rights could be defined even in those cases in which the IP
holder did not license them and only used them as an input into
the development of another product.7 2 For example, in the IMS
Health case, the IP right (the supply of brick-structures) would be
the upstream market, and the product that uses that IP right
(the data provided by IMS and its competitors to the pharmaceu-
tical companies) would define the downstream market.73 It does
not matter that the holder of the IP right does not generally
license it.7 4 It is sufficient that there is "the possibility of identify-
ing a separate market," even if none yet exists.75 Left unquali-
fied, this view could potentially lead to defining separate product
markets for many IP rights that are just used as inputs - per-
haps critical ones - into products or services that are commer-
cialized successfully. As noted by Professor Damien Geradin,
under this standard, "any intellectual property right could 'hypo-
thetically' be marketed as a stand-alone item," and hence poten-
tially subject to an obligation to license, which "would represent
a huge disincentive for dominant firms to invest in new produc-
tion processes that would allow them to gain a competitive ad-
vantage vis-.A-vis competitors. 7 6
As regards the emergence of a new product, the Court con-
cluded that for a refusal to license to be abusive:
70. See IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-418/
01, [2004] E.C.R. -, (ECJ Apr. 29, 2004) (2004 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 192).
71. Id. at -, 45 (LEXIS).
72. See id. at -' 43 (LEXIS).
73. See id. at -' 42 (LEXIS).
74. Id. at, 43 (LEXIS).
75. See id.
76. See Geradin, supra note 8 (manuscript at 11).
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[T] he undertaking which requested the license does not in-
tend to limit itself essentially to duplicating the goods or ser-
vices already offered on the secondary market by the owner of
the copyright, but intends to produce new goods or services
not offered by the owner of the right and for which there is a
potential consumer demand.77
This formulation of the "new product screen" is from a lit-
eral perspective closer to the original formulation in Magill than
the formulation used by Advocate-General Tizzano and, more
importantly, less likely to be construed expansively. And yet it
has been criticized as too vague, not implementable, and lacking
economic foundation.78
E. Summing Up: The Exceptional Circumstances Test
Under the case law of the Community Courts, a refusal to
grant access to IP rights which are "indispensable" to compete
constitutes an abuse that requires compulsory licensing as a rem-
edy when three conditions hold cumulatively: the grant of a li-
cense must result in a "new product," the failure to grant that
license must "exclude any competition," and the refusal must
not be "objectively justified."
1. Indispensability
The ECJ has explained the sorts of economic evidence that
is required for establishing indispensability. First, the product or
service to which access is requested must be useful for the exer-
cise of the activity in question.79 Second, "it must be determined
whether there are products or services which constitute alterna-
tive solutions, even if they are less advantageous ... ."80 Further-
more, "it must be established, at the very least, that the creation
of those products or services is not economically viable for pro-
duction on a scale comparable to that of the undertaking which
77. IMS Health, [2004] E.C.R. at -, 49 (LEXIS).
78. See Geradin, supra note 8; see also Ridyard, supra note 8.
79. In TierciLadbroke, the refusal was regarded lawful because the requested IP, live
pictures of French races, was not indispensable to compete in the relevant market. See
Tierc6 Ladbroke SA v. Commission, Case T-504/93, [1997] E.C.R. 11-923, 11-936-37, 1
27-28.
80. IMS Health, [2004] E.C.R. at -, 1 28 (LEXIS) (citing Oscar Bronner GmbH &
Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-7/97,
[1998] E.C.R. 1-7791, 1-7806 1 43-44).
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controls the existing product or service." ' In short, the ECJ re-
quires the Commission to examine whether the cost of duplicat-
ing the allegedly essential facility constitutes a barrier to entry
such that "it deters any prudent undertaking from entering the
market.
'8 2
Two observations are in order. First, the key economic
question is, therefore, whether the investments required for du-
plicating the facility to which access is requested would deter en-
try by a reasonably efficient competitor. Of course, the impact
on entry depends on the entrant's expectations about its sales
and prices post entry.8 3 Bronner, for example, argued that it
could not afford replicating the home-delivery system of
Mediaprint because of its small distribution. 4 However, Bron-
ner's calculation was incorrect because it relied on an unreason-
able assumption regarding its distribution after the introduction
of the new home-delivery system.8 5 In this respect, the Court
clarified:
For such access to be capable of being regarded as indispen-
sable, it would be necessary at the very least to establish ....
that it is not economically viable to create a second home-
delivery scheme for the distribution of daily newspapers with
a circulation comparable to that of the daily newspapers dis-
tributed by the existing scheme.86
Second, evidence of lack of competition is a necessary but
not sufficient condition for a finding of indispensability. As
noted by Dr. John Temple Lang, the analysis should focus on
whether it is possible for a second substitute facility to be cre-
ated, and not on whether competitors will in fact make the in-
vestment.87 There may be no competition even when competi-
81. Id. at , 28 (LEXIS) (citing Bronner, [1998] E.C.R. 1-7791, 1-7807, 46).
82. See Bronner, [1998], E.C.R. 1-7791, 1-7813-14, 66.
83. See generally Mats A. Bergman, The Role of the Essential Facilities Doctrine, 46 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 403 (2001); Mats A. Bergman, When Should an Incumbent Be Obliged To
Share Its Infrastructure with an Entrant Under the General Competition Rules? (Sept.
2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Uppsala University), available at http://
www.nek.uu.se/pdf/wp2003-25.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2005).
84. See Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, Bronner, [1998], E.C.R. 1-7791, 1-7814,
68.
85. See id. at 1-7814-15, 69.
86. Id. 46.
87. SeeJohn Temple Lang, The Principle of Essential Facilities in EC Competition Law
- The Position Since Bronner, 1 J. NETWORK INDUSTRIES 375, 382 (2000).
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tors have access to the inputs required to compete if: (a) their
products are regarded as less desirable by consumers according
to their own and subjective preferences; or (b) they are particu-
larly inefficient in production.
2. Complete Foreclosure
The Court in IMS Health required the refusal to supply re-
sult in "excluding all competition" in a secondary market.8 In
earlier cases - e.g., Commercial Solvents - the Court appeared to
apply a weaker standard: the elimination of all competition in
the relevant market on the part of the undertaking which re-
quested access.8° Yet in Bronner, the Court clarified that it was
necessary to show that supply is indispensable to carry on busi-
ness on that market, ° or in other words that the refusal was
"such as to exclude any competition on a secondary market."9"
3. New Product
As we saw above, the ECJ finds that a refusal to grant access
to intellectual property constitutes an abuse of Article 82, "where
the undertaking which requested the licence.., intends to pro-
duce new goods or services not offered by the owner of the right
and for which there is a potential consumer demand. '9 2 The
Court has found that a refusal to grant a license prevented the
emergence of a new product only in Magill in which, as de-
scribed in greater detail above, three television stations each pro-
vided separate weekly listings of their programs, but there was no
weekly television guide that provided consumers with simultane-
ous access to the television programs of all three. 3 The Court
found that the weekly television guide was a new product and
that a refusal to grant access to the individual television sched-
ules prevented the emergence of that product for which there was
88. See IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-
418/01, [2004] E.C.R. .... 38-40 (ECJ Apr. 29, 2004) (2004 ECJ CELEX LEXIS
192) (emphasis added).
89. See, e.g., Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A. & Commercial Solvents Corp.
v. Commission, Joined Cases C-6/73 & C-7/73, [1974] E.C.R. 223, 250-51, 25.
90. See Opinion of Advocate-GenralJacobs, Bronner, [1998] E.C.R. 1-7791, 1-7810,
52.
91. IMS Health, [2004] E.C.R. at -, 38 (LEXIS).
92. Id. at -, 49 (LEXIS).
93. See supra notes 29-46 and accompanying text (discussing the Magill case).
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evidence of potential demand.94
The Court did not clarify in IMS Health how much novelty is
required for a product to be "new." As with markets, the bound-
aries between products are not precise. It is therefore a matter
ofjudgment whether a product is a "new" one. That can be seen
by reference to Magill. BBC published a weekly magazine that
contained its own television listings.95 Would a firm be offering
a new product if it provided the BBC listings in a different col-
our than the BBC offered them? Would a firm be offering a new
product if it provided the BBC listings in a different format than
the BBC offered? Would a firm be offering a new product if it
inserted the BBC's television listing (but not the other television
listings) as part of its own weekly magazine designed to compete
with the BBC's magazine? We doubt that most observers would
consider these to be new products, although these "improve-
ments" in the BBC television listings would result in product vari-
ants that did not exist before. Moreover, if such trivial changes
create "new products," the test is meaningless as it will never be
constraining. We will come back to this issue in Section 5 below,
where we set out an economic framework for determining
whether a product is "new."
4. Objective Justification
One of the conditions listed by the Court in IMS Health for a
refusal to be abusive is that it "is not justified by objective consid-
erations."9 6 The Court went somewhat further in Bronner by re-
quiring that "such refusal was incapable of being objectively justi-
fied.'
F. The New Balancing Test: Microsoft
On March 24, 2004, the Commission issued a decision in its
case against Microsoft.98 The Commission concluded, inter alia,
that Microsoft had abused its dominant position in the PC oper-
94. See MagillJoined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, [1995] E.C.R. 1-743, at 1-823-
24, 52 (emphasis added).
95. See id. at 1-811, 7.
96. See IMS Health, [2004] E.C.R. at -, 11 38-40, 52 (LEXIS).
97. See Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeit-
schriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-7/97, [1998] E.C.R. 1-7791, 1-7805, 1 41.
98. See Microsoft Decision, supra note 5, Commission Decision No. COMP/C-3/
37.792/EEC.
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ating systems market by refusing to provide interoperability in-
formation necessary for competitors to be able to effectively
compete in the so-called workgroup server operating systems
market.99 Besides fining Microsoft for this abuse, the Commis-
sion imposed on Microsoft the remedy of compulsory licensing
or forced disclosure of its proprietary information.100 Specifi-
cally, Microsoft is to draw up detailed lists of protocol specifica-
tions to enable third parties to interconnect with Microsoft Win-
dows client and server operating systems so that a non-Microsoft
operating system could replace a Windows server without loss of
functionality.''
On June 7, 2004, Microsoft appealed the decision of the Eu-
ropean Commission before the CFI.' °2 Microsoft sought the an-
nulment of the decision or, in the alternative, annulment of or a
substantial reduction in the fine. l03 The CFI'sjudgment on this
application is pending. On June 25, 2004, Microsoft also applied
for suspension of the Commission's remedies.'0 4 This last appli-
cation was dismissed by order of the President of the CFI, Judge
Vesterdorf.115 His opinion concluded that the evidence ad-
duced by Microsoft was not sufficient to show that the remedies
imposed by the Commission would cause serious and irreparable
harm to Microsoft in case the Court resolves in its favor in the
main action. 10 6
As noted by the President of the CFI, "this case raises the
question [inter alia] whether the conditions laid down by the
Court in IMS Health . . . are necessary or merely sufficient."1 0 7
This question will have to be resolved when Microsoft's applica-
tion for annulment is finally resolved. The Commission con-
tends that they are merely sufficient. For the Commission:
99. See id. 779-81.
100. See id. 998-99.
101. See id. 999.
102. See Order of the President of the Court of First Instance of 26 July 2004,
Microsoft v. Commission, Case T-204/04 R, [2004] E.C.R. _lJuly 26, 2004) (2004 ECJ
CELEX LEXIS 390), 11.
103. See id.
104. See id. 13.
105. See Order of the President of the Court of First Instance of 22 December
2004, Microsoft v. Commission, Case T-204/04 R; 478 (CFI Dec. 22, 2004) (not yet
reported).
106. See id. 461-76.
107. Id. 206.
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There is no persuasiveness to an approach that would advo-
cate the existence of an exhaustive checklist of exceptional
circumstances and would have the Commission disregard a
limine other circumstances of exceptional character that may
deserve to be taken into account when assessing a refusal to
supply.108
The Commission argues that in each case it must analyze
the "entirety of the circumstances" surrounding a specific re-
fusal,"0 9 and that a refusal may be abusive, even though the con-
ditions hitherto laid out by the Community Courts are not satis-
fied." Indeed, the criteria used in its Decision are different
from the ones laid out by the Court in IMS Health (although the
Commission takes the view that they are consistent with IMS
Health, assuming that the IMS Health conditions are sufficient but
not necessary). In Microsoft, licensing is mandated if (1) the
requested IP is "necessary" for a competitor to "viably stay on the
market;' (2) the refusal represents a reduction in "the level of
disclosures;" 1' 2 (3) "there is a risk of elimination of competition"
in the secondary market;' 13 (4) the refusal to supply "has the
consequence of stifling innovation in the impacted market;"' 1 4
and (5) the refusal is not objectively justified, because "on bal-
ance, the possible negative impact of an order to supply on (the
dominant firm's) incentives to innovate is outweighed by its posi-
tive impact on the level of innovation of the whole industry."' 15
Are the "exceptional circumstances" in IMS Health necessary
or sufficient?" 6 This is a complex question on which the case
108. Id. 555.
109. Id. 558. The Commission also refers to the judgment in Micro LeaderBus. v.
Commission, Case T-198/98, [1999] E.C.R. 11-3989, 11-4010-11, 77 56-57 to conclude that
"the factual situations where the exercise of an exclusive right by an intellectual prop-
erty right-holder may constitute an abuse of a dominant position cannot be restricted to
one particular set of circumstances." Id. 557.
110. See Order of the President of the Court of First Instance, IMS Health, [2004]
E.C.R. at __, 206.
111. See Microsoft Decision, supra note 5, 779, Commission Decision No. COMP/C-
3/37.792/EEC.
112. Id. 780.
113. Id. 7 781.
114. Id. 782.
115. Id. 783.
116. It should be noted that the concept of necessary condition has some limits
when applied to Article 82 EC: conditions are necessary for a finding of abuse in certain
types of situations. That is, the concept of "necessary condition" is relative to a certain set
of cases.
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law provides only limited guidance. It is true that the Court held
in IMS Health that the new product condition, the elimination of
all competition condition, and the lack of objective justification
condition are three "sufficient" cumulative conditions. 17 But if
one reads that paragraph with caution, it appears that the indis-
pensability condition is not only sufficient but also necessary for
a finding of abuse. 1 8 Furthermore, the Court stated, "the re-
fusal ... may be regarded as abusive only where the undertaking
which requested the license does not intend to limit itself essen-
tially to duplicating the goods or services already offered on the
secondary market by the owner of the copyright."" 9 This sug-
gests that the new product condition may also be necessary for a
finding of abuse.
Whether the exceptional circumstances in IMS Health are
necessary may or may not affect the final outcome of the
Microsoft case, but this is not the relevant question from a poli-
cymaking perspective. The crucial questions are: (1) Is it desira-
ble to have a rule that specifies the set of necessary and sufficient
conditions under which a refusal to license IP should be re-
garded as abusive? (2) Are the exceptional circumstances laid
out by the Court in IMS Health those necessary and sufficient
conditions? Or, (3) is it preferable to rely on a balancing ap-
proach to the assessment of refusals to license which pays close
attention to individual circumstances, as the Commission pro-
posed in Microsoft? We will provide answers to these questions in
Section 5 below.
III. DESIGNING AN "OPTIMAL" LEGAL RULE -
AN ERROR-COST FRAMEWORK
How could we determine what is the most appropriate stan-
dard for the antitrust assessment of refusals to license IP by a
dominant firm? Or, in other words, what should be the criteria
used to compel the licensing of a dominant firm's IP? In this
Article, we apply a simple error-cost methodology for designing
117. See IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-
418/01, [2004] E.C.R. , -, 38 (ECJ Apr. 29, 2004) (2004 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 192).
118. See id. ("It is clear from that case-law that, in order for the refusal by an under-
taking which owns a copyright to give access to a product or service indispensable for carrying
on a particular business to be treated as abusive, it is sufficient that three cumulative
conditions be satisfied") (emphasis added).
119. Id. 49.
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optimal antitrust standards that is based on Bayesian decision
theory and economic knowledge. 12' This method is structured
in two stages. First, economic theory and evidence are used to
assess the cost and likelihood of errors resulting from condemn-
ing welfare-increasing business practices or condoning welfare-
reducing ones. Second, based on that assessment, a legal rule
that minimizes the expected cost of intervention taking into ac-
count the possibility of legal error is selected from a spectrum of
standards ranging from per se legality to per se illegality, including
the rule of reason.
In Part IV, we draw on the economics of intellectual prop-
erty rights to determine the expected costs and benefits of com-
pulsory licensing as a remedy in refusal to deal cases brought
under Article 82 EC. The economic literature on innovation is
fairly clear: compulsory licensing, regardless of whether the in-
formation is protected by IP law or simply business secrets, is
likely to reduce the incentives to innovate. Successful innova-
tions, however, can bring great increases in prosperity. Hence,
the right to exclude stimulates the creation of IP for the benefit
of society. However, this comes at a well-known cost. The right
to exclude underlying any IP right generates high rewards only if
its holder can raise the price above the competitive level. Com-
pulsory licensing encourages short-term competition and thus
brings prices down to their competitive level.
In Part V, we consider the welfare properties of five alterna-
tive legal standards: per se legality, per se illegality, rule of reason,
modified per se legality, and modified per se illegality. We identify
which of those standards maximizes long-run consumer welfare
by minimizing the expected cost of intervention when legal er-
rors are possible. Under a per se illegality (legality) standard a
refusal to license IP would always (never) be considered abusive.
A rule of reason standard would balance the costs and benefits
of intervention given the specific facts of the case and, thus,
120. See Evans & Padilla, supra note 7 (supplying information from which this sec-
tion borrows); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1
(1984) [hereinafter Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust] (providing the basis for this
methodology); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973). See generally C. Frederick Beckner III &
Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67 ANrITRUST L.J. 41 (1999); Keith N.
Hylton & Michael Salinger, Tying Law and Policy: A Decision-Theoretic Approach, 69 ANTi-
TRUST LJ. 469 (2001) (offering recent applications).
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would compel licensing when the benefits outweigh the costs of
intervention. Under a modified per se legality (illegality) stan-
dard, a refusal to license is considered legal (illegal) except in
"exceptional circumstances."
IV. THE ECONOMICS OF IP RIGHTS: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
Why do societies grant and enforce IP rights? What is the
impact of compulsory licensing on the incentives for innovation?
What are the costs and benefits of the increased protection of
intellectual property rights? When is compulsory licensing likely
to increase long-run consumer welfare in the context of the re-
fusal to deal cases discussed in Part 2 above? This Part aims to
answer these questions.
A. IP Rights and Innovation
Economists have come to understand the rational basis for
granting and protecting IP rights. 121 An IP right, like all other
property rights, gives its holder the ability to exclude others
from using that property and thereby enables the holder to ap-
propriate the value of the property for himself. That seldom
matters much because most IP rights are not valuable. In fact,
most patents are worthless1 22 and many books go begging for
readers.1 23 Some IP rights, however, are immensely valuable:
the right to exclude results in monopoly prices and profits. IP
rights exist to make great riches possible and thereby stimulate
innovation and creation.
The right to exclude has a direct positive impact on the in-
centives for innovation. Innovators must receive a reward for
121. See DENNIS CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORCANIZA-
TION ch. 16 and references therein (4th ed. 2005).
122. See Mark Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office (Berkeley L. &
Econ., Working Paper No. 16, 2000) (estimating that only five percent of issued patents
are licensed to third parties for royalties). In 1999-2003, 260,000 patents, or more than
one sixth of renewable patents, expired because of non-renewal. See United States Pat-
ent and Trademark Office, Performance and Accountability Report Fiscal Year 2003,
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2003/060401_tablel.html
(last visited Feb. 22, 2005). Roughly 40% of all U.S. patents are maintained though the
entire 20-year period. See Patents Granted by Trilateral Office, at http://www.uspto.
gov/web/tws/tsr99/43pat.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2005).
123. Most new books published by a traditional publisher do not sell more than
5,000 copies. See BRIAN HILL & DEE POWER, THE MAKING OF A BESTSELLER: SUCCESS
STORIES FROM AUTHORS AND THE EDITORS, AGENTS, AND BOOKSELLERS BEHIND THEM 65
(2005).
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their risky and costly investments. This is why society generally
allows, and at times even enables, firms to have market power.
24
Innovations that require great investments must have high re-
wards. Getting a new drug to market, for example, costs about
U.S.$800 million in capitalized costs for pre-regulatory approval
research and development ("R&D") and U.S.$95 million for
post-approval R&D. 125 A Hollywood film costs approximately
U.S.$80 million to make and market.1 26 Investors can only re-
cover the sunk costs incurred at the R&D stage if they can charge
prices that exceed the incremental costs of production when the
innovation is ready to be marketed.
More importantly, rewards must loom large because most
efforts that could be subject to IP protection do not succeed.
Most inventive efforts fail. Many of the failures are invisible: in-
ventors who do not make something that could get a patent,
much less a valuable one, songwriters whose tunes are never
played, and artists whose works are never seen. The failures we
do see, however, illustrate the fleeting nature of success. Only
ten percent of released American movies earn a profit.127 Only
one in approximately 435 drugs considered for production is
marketed.1 28 Inventors and investors will, therefore, only take
risks if they expect that the rewards for the few successes will
compensate for the many failures.
The right to exclude has another important effect on the
incentives for innovation. Without this right, people would tend
to wait for others to incur the costs and risks of innovation and
then free ride on the resulting creations. In the extreme case,
individuals wait for others to invest and, as a result, investment
terminates, innovation ceases,1 29 and the economy stagnates.1 3 0
124. Note that an IP right creates a legal right to exclude the use of that right over
a period of time, but does not necessarily give rise to a dominant position because its
scope (or breadth) may not span the entire relevant product market.
125. SeeJoseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Devel-
opment Costs, 22J. HEALTH ECON. 151 (2003).
126. See Mutating, ECONOMIST, Apr. 26, 2003. The success rate for European mov-
ies is apparently even lower.
127. See A Fine Romance, ECONOMIST, Mar. 31, 2001, at 71.
128. See Henry Grabowski, Patents, Innovation and Access to New Pharmaceuticals, 5 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 849 (2002); see alsoJoseph A. DiMasi et al., Research and Development Costs
for New Drugs by Therapeutic Category: A Study of the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, 7
PHARMAcoECON. 152 (1995).
129. This is a variant of the well-known tragedy of the commons. See Garrett Har-
din, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968).
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B. The Costs and Benefits of IP Protection
Economics, law, and policy have long recognized the rele-
vance of two important and related distinctions in thinking
about the role of IP rights.1 31 The first distinction is ex ante ver-
sus ex post. After IP has been created, it is often most efficient to
make it widely available - ex post, full dissemination and disclo-
sure is optimal. If that approach is adopted as a general policy,
however, the IP will not be created in the first place - ex ante,
the ability to exclude and limit dissemination and disclosure is
optimal for the creation of intellectual property. The second,
related distinction is short run versus long run. In the short run, it
is possible to make consumers better off by making IP freely
available since there are benefits but no costs. In the long run,
making IP freely available will likely make consumers worse off
because innovation will decline.
Successful innovations can and do benefit society substan-
tially. Modern economic research has documented that new
products result in remarkable increases in social welfare. 13 2 The
traditional supply and demand diagram helps to illustrate this
effect (see Figure 1 below). When a new product is introduced,
the value created is the area between the demand curve (D) and
the cost curve (S).1 In other words, each unit of output has a
130. See generally PHILIPPE AGHION & PETER Howrr, ENDOGENOUS GROWTH THEORY
(1997).
131. For an economic perspective, see WILLLAM D. NoRDHAus, INrVErrION,
GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 70-90
(1969); see also Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard-Setting, I INNOVATION POL'Y & ECON. 119 (2001). From a legal side, see Ver-
izon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004);
see also Opinion of Advocate-General Jacobs, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v.
Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-7/97, [1998]
E.C.R. 1-7791.
132. See, e.g., Jerry A. Hausman & Gregory K. Leonard, The Competitive Effects of a
New Product Introduction: A Case Study, 50J. INDUS. ECON. 237, 262 (2002) (finding that
the introduction of Kimberly-Clark bath tissue increased consumer welfare by seven
percent of total bath tissue expenditures); Amil Petrin, Quantifying the Benefits of New
Products: The Case of the Minivan, 110J. POL. ECON. 705, 726-27 (2002) (finding that the
introduction of the minivan increased total welfare).
133. See, e.g., DAVID LAIDLER & SAUL ESTRIN, INTRODUCTION TO MICROECONOMICS
230-31 (3d ed. 1989). There are a variety of technical aspects of this analysis that we are
ignoring here. One we should note, though. The social surplus shown in the diagram
is approximately correct when the good is truly new in the sense that it has no substi-
tutes. More generally, as people shift away from substitutes to the new good, there is a
reduction in social surplus generate by those goods. That reduction offsets the social
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social value that is the difference between the value shown by the
demand curve and the cost of producing it. The overall social
value of a product innovation is the sum of those differences:
the area CS + TT.
FIGURE 1: SOCIAL VALUE OF NEW PRODUCT
€/Q
S
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KI Q
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In Figure 1, the competitive equilibrium is at (Pc,Qc) and it is
located at the intersection of the supply curve, S, which is
given by the incremental costs of production, and the de-
mand curve D. Social value equals the sum of consumer sur-
plus (CS) and producer surplus (TT).
In a seminal study, Professor Jerry Hausman calculated so-
cial value.134 He found that a new cereal - one made by adding
apple and cinnamon to an existing cereal - created value of
U.S.$78.1 million per year in the United States." 5 A new drug
has a greater social value. The value of saving or improving lives
dwarfs the seemingly exorbitant costs of some drugs.' 36 Simi-
surplus shown in the figure. The corollary of this is that goods which are merely varia-
tions on existing goods generate proportionally less social surplus than novel goods.
134. SeeJerry A. Hausman, Valuation of New Goods Under Perfect and Imperfect Competi-
tion, in THE ECONOMICS OF NEW GOODS (Timothy F. Bresnahan & Robert J. Gordon
eds., 1997).
135. See id.
136. The estimated social value of increases in life expectancy due to advances in
medical research from 1970 to 1990, was estimated to amount to U.S.$2.8 trillion per
year. Kevin M. Murphy & Robert H. Topel, The Economic Value of Medical Research, in
MEASURING THE GAINS FROM MEDICAL RESEARCH: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH (Kevin M.
Murphy & Robert H. Topel eds., 2003).
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larly, technical change - due to product and process innova-
tions - has resulted in rapid increases in productivity and im-
proved standards of living around the world. 13 7
FIGURE 2: MONOPOLY-LOSS TRIANGLE
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As in Figure 1, the competitive equilibrium in Figure 2 is at
(Pc,Qc). The monopoly outcome results in a higher price
and lower quantity given by (P*,Q*). The result is a dead-
weight loss of welfare to society given by L, commonly known
as the monopoly-loss triangle. rr is the monopoly profit and
CS is consumer surplus. The negative impact of monopoly
power on consumer welfare is equal to the sum of the supra-
competitive profits (@) and the deadweight loss (L).
The social rewards from fostering new products come at a
well-known cost. An IP right is effective only if its holder can
raise price above the competitive level by restricting output be-
low the competitive level. The result is the well known "monop-
oly-loss triangle," given by the value that consumers do not get
from the output the monopolist does not produce138 (see area L
in Figure 2 above). For example, one can imagine the value that
137. See Rolf Fare et al., Productivity Growth, Technical Progress, and Efficiency Change
in Industrialized Countries, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 66 (1994); see also STEVEN GLOBERMAN,
INDUS. CAN. RESEARCH PUBLN'S PROGRAM, LINKAGES BETWEEN TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 23 (2000).
138. See, e.g., id.
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society loses when pharmaceutical companies charge prices for
pills that far exceed the cost of manufacturing those pills.
Policymakers must decide whether or not the gains from
stimulating investment in innovation truly outweigh the losses
from allowing a monopoly to persist. Industrial societies have
balanced these considerations and reached a consensus - dif-
ferences remain mainly at the margin."' We can summarize this
consensus as follows:
First, societies rely on a number of "social" or "policy" in-
struments to stimulate intellectual creations. These include
prizes, honors, social prestige, and government funding. Copy-
rights, patents, and trade secrets fill out the arsenal in promot-
ing creations because strong IP rights are needed to stimulate
innovation and investment.
Second, governments have made complex economic policy
judgments regarding IP rights. They have chosen to enforce
those rights through laws and institutions. The logic behind this
choice is that innovations - and the new and improved prod-
ucts and processes they entail - are extraordinarily valuable.
While some may bemoan the high cost of pharmaceuticals, the
fact is that in the absence of patent protection, few of these
drugs would have been produced, put through clinical trials,
and marketed to doctors.1 40 Yet, as observed above, these drugs
have brought almost incalculable benefits in extending the lifes-
139. Some degree of convergence in IP systems and laws has resulted from interna-
tional treaties. See, e.g., Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised July 24, 1971,, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986), 828
U.N.T.S. 221; Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645; Patent Law
Treaty, June 1, 2000, 39 I.L.M 1047; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property, Apr. 15, 1994, Marakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Or-
ganization, Annex IC, 31 LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33
I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. Signatories to these treaties are re-
quired to comply with standards guaranteeing some level of IP protection. See id.
140. See, e.g., Henry Grabowski, Patents and New Product Development in the
Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Industries (July 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with Duke University), at http://www.econ.duke.edu/Papers/Other/Grabowski/
Patents.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2005); Henry Grabowski, Patents, Innovation and Access
to New Pharmaceuticals, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 849 (2002); Edwin Mansfield, Patents and
Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. Sci. 173 (1986); Testimony of the Biotechnol-
ogy Industry Organization on Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in
the Knowledge E-based Economy Before the Federal Trade Commission and the De-
partment of Justice (Feb. 26, 2002), at http://www.bio.org/ip/action/ftc022002.pdf
(last visited Apr. 22, 2005).
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pan and improving the quality of life."' The same conclusion
may be drawn for many modern industries - IP protection has
brought tremendous value.
Third, governments have defined limits to the protection
afforded by the law. Grants of IP protection come with strings
attached. For example, third parties can use patented inven-
tions twenty years after the patent filing. 4 2 Similarly, copy-
righted material eventually can be reproduced and distributed at
no cost (although the duration for which exclusive rights should
be protected is hotly debated).' 43 Furthermore, there is a vast
category of "intellectual stuff' for which it is not possible to ob-
tain property rights. Some creations of the mind may be so valu-
able from a social standpoint that we do not want to restrict their
use. It is not possible to obtain protection for theorems or dis-
coveries of general laws of nature.'44 That is why Einstein could
get patent protection for his many refrigerator innovations but
not for the general theory of relativity. One also must be careful
not to assign property rights unnecessarily; some ideas are there
for the taking because they are obvious. For example, McDon-
ald's could not protect the fast-food franchise idea, nor Wal-Mart
the idea of having efficient superstores.
C. Compulsory Licensing in Refusal to Deal Cases
Suppose a dominant firm in an upstream market refuses to
license its intellectual property to a third party with whom it
competes in a downstream market. Under which conditions
would its welfare be increasing enough to compel the dominant
firm to license its IP?t45 From the previous Sections, it should be
clear that compulsory licensing has three main (and opposing)
141. See Murphy & Topel, supra note 136.
142. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2005); see also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 163.
143. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-303 (2005); see alsoJohn Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use?: The
Triumph of Natural-Law Copyright, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 465, 489-92 (2005).
144. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2005).
145. Throughout this Article the term "welfare" refers to social welfare (the sum of
consumer and producer surpluses) - the measure economists mainly advocate for
evaluating competition policy, although the majority of economists' analysis is not de-
pendent on using social welfare or the narrower measure of consumer welfare typically
used by courts and regulatory authorities. See generally MASSiMO MoTrA, COMPETITION
Poucy: THEORY AND PRACTICE (2004). See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust
Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968); see also Richard Schmalen-
see, Sunk Costs and Antitrust Barriers to Entry, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 466 (2004).
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effects on welfare. First, compulsory licensing reduces the incen-
tives to innovate in the long run. As Professor Massimo Motta
states, " [i] f antitrust agencies tried to eliminate or reduce mar-
ket power whenever it appeared, this would have the detrimental
effect of eliminating firms' incentives to innovate." 146 The im-
pact on social welfare of a fall in the incentives for innovation is
potentially very large and equal to the reduction in total surplus
(area Tr + CS in Figure 2) that results from a lower number of
product and process innovations. A lower rate of innovation
means less profits (area Tr) and lower consumer surplus (area
CS). This negative effect will be largest when the products that
competitors manufacture when having access to the requested
IP are close substitutes to those of the IP holder.
Second, compulsory licensing may increase competition in
the short term, thus eliminating the deadweight loss from mar-
ket power (area L in Figure 2) and increasing consumer welfare
in the short term (area r in Figure 2). This effect will be largest
when the degree of market power derived from the exercise of
the IP right is greatest. 47 That is, when the right to exclude
embodied in the IP right leads to the exclusion of all competi-
tion in the downstream market, possibly because access to that
IP is indispensable to carry on business on that market.
Finally, compulsory licensing may also have a positive effect
on consumer welfare in the long run if it facilitates the develop-
ment of new products for which there is potential demand - in
other words, it increases the ability of third parties to innovate.
Which of the two effects is quantitatively most important?
In particular, are the dynamic effects of compulsory licensing
likely to outweigh the static effects? In principle, it is close to
impossible to balance accurately the welfare-increasing and wel-
fare-decreasing effects of compulsory licensing, or for that mat-
ter of any unilateral business practice.1 48 As a first approxima-
tion, this involves comparing areas CS + r (the welfare cost of
compulsory licensing) and T + L (the welfare benefit of compul-
sory licensing), or simplifying areas CS and L, which is no doubt
146. Mo-rA supra note 145, at 64.
147. When that is the case, the difference between the price that would prevail
under compulsory licensing (PC in Figure 2) and the price without compulsory licensing
(P* in Figure 2) is largest, and hence consumer surplus ("CS") is smallest.
148. See David S. Evans, How Can Economists Help Courts Design Competition Rules? An
E.U. and U.S. Perspective, WoRLn COMPETITION (forthcoming 2005).
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a complex exercise. However, we can state the following two
propositions:
PROPOSITION 1. In general, in the absence of any positive effects
on innovation, compulsory licensing is likely to have an overall negative
impact on welfare - i.e., area CS is likely to be larger than area L.
Proposition 1 states that if compulsory licensing does not
have a positive dynamic effect on innovation, then it is likely to
be socially harmful. This is true for the following reasons. First,
the available evidence indicates that innovators do not generally
appropriate the entire social value of their innovations, and that
most of the value of the new products and processes are sooner
or later passed on to consumers.149 Professor William Nordhaus
of Yale University, using data from the U.S. non-farm business
sector, finds that innovators are able to capture about 2.2% of
the total surplus from innovation.15 ° These findings imply, first,
that the private incentives to innovate are likely to be lower than
the socially optimal, but also that the degree of market power de
facto enjoyed by innovators is rather limited (having said that,
intervention is likely to focus on firms with a certain degree of
market power). Consequently, compulsory licensing is likely to
depress innovation from levels that are inefficiently low, without
any significant pro-competitive effect in the short-term. In terms
of Figure 2, this suggests that area CS is likely to be large and
area L small.
Second, area L may also be small because compulsory li-
censing may not only reduce welfare in the long run, but also in
the short term. 151 Compulsory licensing may: (a) facilitate entry
of inefficient producers in the downstream market; (b) promote
licensing arrangements that discourage potential entrants to de-
velop products that are sufficiently different from those of the IP
holder, thus reducing product variety in the marketplace; and
(c) encourage licensing arrangements that help companies coor-
dinate their respective commercial policies, leading to higher
149. See WILLLtm D. NoRDHAus, SCHUMPETERIAN PROFITS IN THE AMERICAN ECON-
OMY: THEORY AND MEASUREMENT 4 & n.6 (Cowles Found. Discussion Paper No. 1457,
Apr. 2004), available at http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d14b/dl457.pdf (last visited
Apr. 22, 2005) (discussing the effect of new products and processes on consumers).
150. See id. at 22.
151. SeeRichardJ. Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, An Economic Analysis of Unilateral Refusals
To License Intellectual Property, 93 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. USA 12749, 12750 (1996) (ar-
guing for the reduction of welfare in the short-run).
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prices. 152 In this last respect, as noted by then Professor and now
Judge Frank Easterbrook, 5 3 a contradiction exists between the
primary antitrust goal of protecting and promoting aggressive
competition on the merits and a policy that imposes an obliga-
tion to deal with competitors in order to achieve a level playing
field, irrespective of differences in business acumen, skill or fore-
sight.
PROPOSITION 2. The forced disclosure of IP is most likely to in-
crease long-run consumer welfare when (a) the requested IP is indispen-
sable to compete, (b) the refusal to license causes the exclusion of all com-
petition from the downstream market, (c) the refusal prevents the emer-
gence of markets for new products for which there is substantial demand,
and (d) the products to be developed by the licensees are sufficiently differ-
entiated from those of the IP right holder, e.g., because they satisfy needs
that the existing products failed to address.
Conditions (a) and (b), which as a matter of economics are
two faces of the same coin, ensure that the short-term welfare
loss resulting from a refusal to license is relatively large (area L is
large). Condition (c) implies that the refusal has a long-run cost
as well as a short-term cost, and condition (d) says that the long-
run cost of compulsory licensing - the reduction in the incen-
tives to innovate - is relatively low. When (c) and (d) fai to
hold, Proposition 1 applies and, therefore, compulsory licensing
should be presumed harmful: the obligation to deal is bound to
have a profound adverse effect on the incentives for innovation
and the creation of IP, which is likely to outweigh any possible
social benefit in the short term.
When conditions (a) to (d) hold, then compulsory licensing
has both positive and negative effects and in principle may be
beneficial. However, it is still unclear whether the negative ef-
fects of compulsory licensing on the incentives to innovate are
outweighed by the positive effects on the incentives and ability of
third parties to innovate. In other words, even if conditions (a)
to (d) hold, compulsory licensing may still be welfare reducing.
On the other hand, compulsory licensing may be welfare
increasing even if (a) and (b) fail to hold, provided that condi-
152. SeeJames Gibson, Re-ReifyingData, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 163, 228-29 (2004)
(discussing the effects of compulsory licensing).
153. See Frank Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 972 (1986).
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tions (c) and (d) are satisfied. 154 This is because the positive
effects of compulsory licensing on third-party innovation may
offset any harm from reduced incentives to innovate. However,
one would expect no unilateral refusal to license when (c) and
(d) hold. In those circumstances the IP holder is likely to be
better off by licensing its IP and reaping some of the rents gener-
ated by the new products at no cost for its own existing business.
In other words, when (c) and (d) hold,1 55 there is likely to be a
mutually acceptable license with some potential licensees since
total industry profits when there is a license exceed total industry
profits when the IP holder refuses to license.
Not surprisingly, most economists are skeptical about the
desirability of compulsory licensing:
An obligation to deal does not necessarily increase economic
welfare even in the short run. In the long run, obligations to
deal can have profound adverse incentives for investment and
for the creation of intellectual property. Although there is no
obvious economic reason why intellectual property should be
immune from an obligation to deal, the crucial role of incen-
tives for the creation of IP is reason enough to justify skepti-
cism toward policies that call for compulsory licensing.' 56
Professors Richard Gilbert and Carl Shapiro, commenting on
Magill, explained the reasons why they would not support neces-
sarily compulsory licensing of property even when "such prop-
erty is necessary for the production and marketing of a new
product for which there is potential consumer demand".5 7
This skepticism remains even after taking into account the
possibility of fine tuning the obligation to deal by allowing posi-
tive, reasonable and non-discriminatory royalty rates. No doubt,
the welfare consequences of a compulsory licensing obligation
depend, among other things, on the form of the licensing ar-
rangement (e.g., fixed licensing fees v. two part tariffs) and the
level of the royalty rates, if any. A zero royalty rate will promote
154. Note that conditions (c) and (d) may hold even when (a) and (b) do not,
since the requested IP may be indispensable to develop the new product or service but
not to remain active in the market.
155. In fact, IP holders may have an incentive to license their IP even if this leads
to the emergence of (perfect) substitutes. It is basically a function of setting the licen-
see fee at the appropriate level.
156. Gilbert & Shapiro, supra note 151, at 12754.
157. See id.
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the entry of inefficient competitors and have a major negative
effect on investment. If the royalty rate is high, however, the
compulsory license may not provide meaningful access. 158
Before moving to consider the optimal legal standard for IP
refusals, note that none of the arguments raised in this Section,
and in particular Propositions 1 and 2, is specific to IP. They all
apply mutatis mutandis, to refusals to grant access to any form of
tangible or intangible property which is the result of previous
investment or risk taking. What matters is the impact of forcing
access on the incentives to innovate, and not the nature of the
property rights at stake. So, the optimal legal standard charac-
terized in the next Section should be taken as applying to the
assessment of unilateral refusals to grant access to any form of
property.
V. APPLYING THE RULEMAKING FRAMEWORK
This Section is structured in four parts. First, we consider
the costs and likelihood of legal error in refusal to deal cases.
That is, the cost of mandating access when compulsory licensing
should not be ordered (i.e., when the refusal to license was legit-
imate) and vice versa. Second, we characterize the optimal legal
standard for the assessment of unilateral refusals to license.
Third, we consider the extent to which the ECJ's "exceptional
circumstances test"159 and the Commission's Microsoft test imple-
ment that optimal standard. 60 Finally, we focus on the narrower
question of how to make the new product condition in Magill
and IMS Health operational in practice.
A. Type I and Type H Errors
In the context of antitrust laws, a legal standard determines
the conditions under which a unilateral business practice is
found to be anti-competitive. However, whatever the standard
for the competitive assessment of a business practice - such as a
refusal to license IP - there will be mistakes.16 In some cases,
158. See id. at 12573.
159. See Magil, Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, [1995] E.C.R. 1-743.
160. Microsoft Decision, supra note 5, Commission Decision No. COMP/C-3/
37.792/EEC.
161. See Evans & Padilla, supra note 7, at 16-17 (discussing briefly the causes of
those mistakes).
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the refusal to license will be considered abusive when it is not
(causing what in the jargon of Bayesian decision theory are
known as type I errors), while in others the refusal to license will
be regarded as legitimate when it should have been considered
abusive (type II errors).162 The expected costs of those two kinds
of errors are a function of their welfare implications and their
likelihood of occurring. The latter depends, in turn, on a num-
ber of factors, most importantly, the legal standard itself. A
weaker standard makes it easier to establish that a practice is
anti-competitive and, therefore, reduces the likelihood of type II
errors (or false acquittals) while increasing the likelihood of type
I errors (or false convictions).
In a refusal to license IP case, the cost of a type I error is
mainly given by a reduction in the incentives to invest and inno-
vate for firms. Evidence of false convictions is bound to reduce
the incentives to invest by reducing the expected rate of return
on successful innovations. In welfare terms, therefore, the cost
of a type I error is equal to the loss in welfare resulting from the
lack of introduction of valuable goods and services for which
there is potential demand. That is given by area CS + r in Figure
2.
The cost of a type II error in this type of cases is equal to the
sum of: (1) the loss of consumer welfare that results from supra-
competitive prices; and (2) the potential reduction in consumer
welfare resulting from the fact that some new products and ser-
vices may not see the light in the absence a license. The first
term, in turn, is given by two effects: (a) some consumers pay
more than in an otherwise competitive market to obtain the
good or service they wish (area rr in Figure 2 above); and (b)
other consumers see themselves excluded from consumption de-
spite their relatively high valuations (area L in Figure 2.)
From this analysis, it should be clear that in the assessment
of refusals to license IP both types of errors are likely and costly.
However, from Proposition 1, we get a third proposition:
PROPOSITION 3. In general, unless the refusal to license prevents
the emergence of new products with high probability, the cost of a type I
error is greater that the cost of a type II error in refusal to license IP cases.
162. See generally PROBABILITY AND INFERENCE IN THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: THE USES
AND LIMITS OF BAYESIANISM (Peter Tillers & Eric D. Green eds., 1988).
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B. The Choice of Legal Standard
Consider the following set of legal standards for the assess-
ment of unilateral refusals to license: per se legality, per se illegal-
ity, rule of reason, and modified per se legality and illegality.
Each of these standards or rules will give rise to different error
costs. The social objective is to find the rule that minimizes the
expected cost of these errors.
Under a per se illegality (legality) standard, there would be
type I errors (type II errors), but no type II errors (type I errors),
since a refusal to license IP would always (never) be considered
abusive.' 63 A rule of reason standard would cause both type I
and type II errors in proportions that are difficult to predict ac-
curately; distinguishing between pro-competitive and anti-com-
petitive refusals to deal is a daunting task. Finally, a modified per
se legality (illegality) standard would cause type II errors (type I
errors) but no type I errors (type II errors), but it will be less
likely to do so than a pure per se legality (illegality) rule.
From an error cost perspective, a modified per se rule is su-
perior to a per se rule for the assessment of refusals to license IP.
This is because the modified per se rule reduces the likelihood of
error when error is clearly possible. A modified per se legality
rule is also preferable to a per se legality rule, because it can be
tailored to mandate access when the refusal prevents the emer-
gence of new products with high probability - a crucial caveat
in Proposition 3.
From Proposition 3, it is also immediate that for this type of
cases a modified per se legality rule is preferable to a modified per
se illegality one, as the former minimizes the incidence of the
type of error that is most costly. A similar line of argument ap-
plies to the comparison between a modified per se legality rule
and the rule of reason. A modified per se legality rule would re-
sult in more false acquittals (or type II errors), but would cause
fewer false convictions (or type I errors) which, according to
Proposition 3, are in general more harmful. Another important
reason in favor of a modified per se legality rule is that is easier
and cheaper to administer and enforce than a rule of reason
standard.16 4
163. Assuming that there are no errors at the assessment of dominance.
164. See KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAw: ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAW
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Hence, the optimal standard takes the form of a modified
per se legality rule. That implies that a refusal to license will be
considered legal except in "exceptional circumstances." Only
when those exceptional circumstances are met is it desirable to
compel a dominant firm to license its IP to competitors.
To summarize,
PROPOSITION 4. The optimal legal standard for the antitrust as-
sessment of refusals to license IP by dominant companies takes the form of
a modified per se legality rule, where compulsory licensing is required only
in exceptional circumstances.
In Part II.F we posed the question: is it desirable to have a
rule that specifies the set of necessary and sufficient conditions
under which a refusal to license IP should be regarded as abu-
sive? Proposition 4 answers affirmatively: compulsory licensing
should be mandated only in exceptional circumstances.
But what should those circumstances be? A reasonable an-
swer is to restrict intervention to those circumstances where
compulsory licensing is most likely to result in a long-run welfare
increase-i.e., conditions (a) to (d) in Proposition 2 above. An
"exceptional circumstances test" based on conditions (a) to (d)
may be both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. As we explain in
Part IV.C, compulsory licensing may be welfare reducing even
when (a) and (d) are satisfied and, conversely, it may be welfare
reducing even when (a) and (b) fail to hold provided that (c)
and (d) are satisfied.
There is no clear alternative, however. Dropping conditions
(a) and (b) would solve the problem of under-inclusiveness, but
would make it even more likely that licensing is mandated when
it should not. Most importantly, there is no practical way-at
least none apparent to us-to restrict compulsory licensing to
those situations in which it would necessarily improve consumer
welfare in the long run. That would require the courts to iden-
tify the set of circumstances where the negative impact on the ex
ante incentives to innovate is less important than the positive im-
pact on the incentives and ability of third parties to innovate ex
post. That is, to the best of our knowledge, an extremely com-
plex task to which many economists have recently devoted time
EVOLUTION 80 & n.27 (2003). Hylton also discusses the rule of reason and the per se
illegality rule in chapters five and six. See id. at 90-131.
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and effort, and for which no clear answer has yet emerged.1 65
C. The Exceptional Circumstances Test and the Microsoft Test
From Proposition 4, it follows immediately that the ECJ's
narrow construction of the obligation to license IP under Article
82 of the EC Treaty in Magill and IMS Health is based on sound
economics and constitutes appropriate public policy. The set of
"exceptional circumstances" in Magill and IMS Health mirrors
conditions (a) to (d) in Proposition 2 and, for the reasons dis-
cussed above, constitutes a reasonable implementation of the
optimal legal standard for the assessment of refusals to licence
IP: modified per se legality.
It is also immediate from Proposition 4 that the Commis-
sion's "balancing," or "rule of reason," test in Microsoft fails to do
so. The Commission's Microsoft test seeks to "balance" the possi-
ble negative impact of an order to supply on the dominant firm's
incentives to innovate with its positive impact on the level of in-
novation of the whole industry.1 6 6 We know that such a balanc-
ing exercise is complex and is likely to produce too many and
too costly false convictions. Also, the conditions laid down by
the Commission in its Microsoft decision (see Part II.F above) are
less stringent than those in Proposition Two and, hence, are
likely to lead to finding a refusal to license abusive when it
should not. 16 7 Mandating access under the conditions specified
in Microsoft is bound to cause a fall in consumer welfare as well as
in overall social welfare.
For example, the complete foreclosure requirement (condi-
tion (b)) in Proposition 2 is replaced with the vague require-
ment that "there is a risk of elimination of competition" in the
secondary market.'68 Likewise, the new product criterion (con-
dition (c)) in Proposition 2 is also replaced with a weaker condi-
tion - one that requires that the refusal to supply, "has the con-
sequence of stifling innovation in the impacted market."169 This
condition does not clarify the nature of that innovation under
165. See SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES (2004), especially chap-
ters five (on sequential innovation) and six (on licensing and competition).
166. See Microsoft, supra note 5, 783, Commission Decision No. COMP/C-3/
37.792/EEC.
167. See id.
168. Id. 781.
169. Id. 782.
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threat. Should it lead to the development of products not yet
offered by the IP holder and for which there is potential de-
mand? Will the Commission consider the cloning of the prod-
ucts of the IP right holder an innovation when applying this test?
Is there a need to show under the Commission test that the inno-
vation that is allegedly discouraged will appeal to consumers?
The Commission includes in its Microsoft test a condition
that is not part of the four conditions in Proposition Two, or
their equivalents in the Magill-IMS Health test, namely that the
refusal to deal represents a disruption of previous levels of sup-
ply.17° But this condition does not make economic sense. It
would imply that an IP holder would be able to exploit his IP
exclusively only if he retains it solely for himself (i.e., if he oper-
ates in a vertically integrated fashion) at all times. If at any time
in the past he was found entering into a licensing agreement
with an independent licensor efficient, however, he could be
compelled to continue with that licensing agreement for as long
the licensor wishes to do so. 1
71
D. Economic Framework for Determining Whether a Product Is New
The ECJ did not specify precisely what is to be understood
by a "new product" in IMS Health. One possible interpretation
would be that the Court requires the new product to be non-
substitutable for existing products, i.e., introducing the new
product would give rise to a separate product market.172 From
the Court's judgment, however, it appears clear that the "new"
product - albeit presenting novel features - can be a substi-
tute for the existing products and, therefore, belongs to the
same relevant product market. Indeed, the Court emphasizes
that the new product(s) are to be offered on the same (secon-
170. See id. 780 (stating that "Microsoft has diminished the level of disclosures
that it makes concerning information necessary to achieve such interoperability . . .
[and] Microsoft has turned down a formal request by Sun concerning such interoper-
ability information").
171. We wish to thank ProfessorJean Tirole from the Institut de Economie Indus-
trielle ("IDEIV) for raising this point to us.
172. See Geradin, supra note 8 (manuscript at 12); see also CLEARY GorrLIEB STEEN
& HAMILTON, LLP, EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE ISSUES ITS JUDGMENT IN THE IMS
HEALTH COMPULSORY LICENSING PROCEEDING 4 (June 3, 2004), at http://www.clearygot-
tlieb.com/files/tbl-s5096AlertMemoranda/FileUpload5741/178/44-2004.pdf (last vis-
ited Apr. 22, 2005).
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dary) market where the IP owner is active. 173
So if the new product does not give rise to a separate prod-
uct market, how can one identify a new product in practice so
that the Court's new product test represents a meaningful limit-
ing principle? In this section we provide a definition that is con-
sistent with the Court's rulings, yields consistent and unambigu-
ous predictions, and is also consistent with the logic of the error-
cost framework employed to show the economic soundness of
the ECJ's "exceptional circumstances test."
We will say that a new product for the purposes of the imple-
mentation of this test is one that satisfies potential demand by
meeting the needs of consumers in ways that existing products
do not. That is, a new product expands the market by bringing in
at current prices consumers who were not satisfied before. It is
in this sense that the new product creates a new option, notjust
variations of the same product as supplied by the IP holder. It is
what Dr. John Temple Lang has called a "new kind of prod-
uct.1 74 For example, suppose there is a market in which prod-
ucts A, B, C, D and E are sold. Product F is a "new product" if it
expands the market, so that the demand for A-Fexceeds the de-
mand for A-E. Product F is not a new product if it does not ex-
pand the market, so that the total demand for A-F is the same as
the demand for A-E.
We can apply this definition to the facts in Magil. A guide
that combines all television listings together may expand de-
mand significantly. That is because a guide that combines all
television listings provides convenience to consumers and,
hence, attracts new consumers into the market. A guide that is
merely a variant of an existing guide is unlikely to expand de-
mand significantly; more likely, it shifts demand from an existing
guide (we present no opinion here on whether this test was in
fact met in Magill.)
173. See IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-
418/01, [2004] E.C.R. -, 52 (ECJ Apr. 29, 2004) (2004 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 192)
(stating that one of three conditions needed for a finding of abuse of dominant posi-
tion within the meaning of Article 82 EC is that, "the undertaking which requested the
license intends to offer, on the market for the supply of the data in question, new
products or services not offered by the copyright owner and for which there is a poten-
tial consumer demand").
174. SeeJohn Temple Lang, supra note 64, at 3 n.7 (stating that the Magilljudg-
ment should be understood as requiring a new kind of product).
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As a practical matter, one must also consider the degree of
expansion. Whenever a firm introduces a product it expands
the market a bit. A product is new if it expands the market by a
"significant" amount. This statement can be illustrated with the
help of the following diagram, which is based on what econo-
mists denote as Hotelling's linear city.17 5
FIGURE 3: THE ECJ'S "NEW PRODUCT CONDITION"
Consumers Consumers
with a preference with a preference
for existing product A for "new" product B
Product Product
A B
Consumer
population
Consumers are located in the linear city. They have hetero-
geneous preferences with respect to products A and B. Con-
sumers' preferences with respect to a product are more in-
tense when they are located closer to that product. In the
picture, products A and B compete in the same relevant prod-
uct market. A price reduction in product A is likely to cause a
reduction in the sales of product B. Yet, at current prices, the
addition of product B to the market increases consumer wel-
fare by adding an entire class of consumers whose prefer-
ences were such that they preferred not to buy anything
rather than buy product A.
In Figure 3, the new product B expands the market by
bringing in consumers that were not interested in product A.
The new product condition is satisfied in this example, but it
would not be so if products A and B were both located at the
center of the linear city competing head-to-head for the same set
of consumers.
A second practical question relates to the burden of estab-
175. See Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41, 45-57 (1929) (ex-
plaining the illustration where, "buyers of a commodity will be uniformly distributed
along a line of length I which may be Main Street in a town or a transcontinental rail-
road. At two ends are places of business").
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lishing that the requested IP is indeed required to produce a
"new product" for which there is "potential consumer demand."
It can be argued that this was not an issue in Magill, because
there was ostensibly clear-cut evidence of significant demand for
the weekly TV guide commercialized by Magill, for which there
were no ready substitutes in the market. But, in many cases, the
party requesting a license may have to disclose its business plans
- and in particular their prospective demand studies - to sat-
isfy the new product requirement. It is hard to see how the bur-
den of proof could be allocated to anyone other than the re-
questing party, given that it is that party who is in possession of
the relevant information.1 76
VI. COMPULSORY LICENSING IN THE UNITED STATES
U.S. law has almost always decided in favor of strong IP
rights and against compulsory licensing. Or, to put it another
way, the U.S. courts have given preeminence to the protection of
the ex ante incentives for innovation over the antitrust goal of ex
post output expansion. For at least a century, the U.S. courts
have started with the proposition that, "[I]t is the privilege of
any owner of property to use it or not use it, without question of
motive" and that "exclusion may be said to have been of the very
essence of [such a] right."1 7 7 The courts have considered
whether there are exceptions to this proposition. They have
generally chosen between a "per se legality" approach and a "re-
buttable presumption" or "modified per se legality" approach; the
per se legality approach admits exceptions but it is more strin-
gent than the rebuttable presumption approach. The differing
approaches are evident from two cases involving similar facts: a
group of Independent Service Organizations ("ISOs") found
that access to the service market for a particular product was ob-
structed by the existence of patents, and claimed that the refusal
to grant access was prohibited by antitrust laws.
In the Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation
("Xerox"), the Federal Circuit 178 opted for the per se legality ap-
176. See CLEARY GoTrLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON, LLP, supra note 172, at 5.
177. Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908).
178. The Federal Circuit is a U.S. appeals court that was established in 1982 "with
the combined jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the
U.S. Court of Claims as well as authorization to hear appeals from several federal ad-
ministrative boards as well as patent cases from the U.S. district courts." See Federal
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proach and ruled that a unilateral refusal to license could only
be limited when a patent was obtained through fraud, an action
to enforce a patent was a sham, or the patent holder used his
right to refuse to sell patented parts to gain a monopoly in a
market beyond the scope of the patent.1 79 Contrast this judg-
ment with that of the First Circuit in Data General v. Grumman
Systems Support, which settled on a rebuttable presumption in
favor of allowing right-holders (even those in a monopoly posi-
tion) to refuse to license.8 ° The First Circuit concluded that, in
the case in question, there was insufficient evidence to rebut
such a presumption: despite the change in Data General's pol-
icy to deal with ISOs, there was no material effect on the compet-
itive process; Data General was both dominant before and after
its change in policy.181
A. Kodak
To date, U.S. courts have held that a refusal to license
breached antitrust law in only one case: Image Technical Services
v. Eastman Kodak ("Kodak") which, like Xerox, involved a photo-
copying company and ISOs."'82 The ISOs claimed they were pre-
vented from continuing to service Kodak photocopiers by Ko-
dak's refusal to supply them, or their customers, with the appro-
priate parts.183  The Ninth Circuit adopted the rebuttable
presumption approach used in Data General18 4 It found that the
presumption that Kodak was free to refuse to supply the parts
had, indeed, been rebutted on the basis that only sixty-five of the
thousands of parts at issue were in fact patented.1 85 A second
factor contributing to the rebuttal was that Kodak's IP justifica-
tions were raised at an extremely late stage in the proceed-
ings. 86 The Court also seemed to have been concerned that Ko-
Judicial Center, Organization of the Federal Circuit, at http://air.fjc.gov/history/jc_-
frm.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2005).
179. See Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1328-29 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
180. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1173-74 (lst
Cir. 1994).
181. See id. at 1187-88.
182. Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1200 (9th
Cir. 1997).
183. See id. at 1200-01.
184. See id. at 1218.
185. See id. at 1219-21.
186. See id.
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dak was using its IP rights as justification for tying practices, even
though the rules relating to tying were not specifically invoked at
the later stages of the case.1 8
7
B. Trinko
Even if Kodak were to be viewed as opening the door to com-
pulsory licensing, the Supreme Court's judgment in Verizon Com-
munications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko ("Trinko") all but
shuts the door firmly.188 Verizon, an incumbent telecom opera-
tor, was obligated by the 1996 Telecommunications Act to pro-
vide access to its local exchange network, including some sup-
port systems that provided customer service.189 AT&T and some
other companies that wanted to offer competing local services
complained that Verizon was not providing access to these sup-
port systems.19 ° Federal and state regulators agreed and fined
Verizon.10  An antitrust class action seeking damages fol-
lowed.192 The lower court rejected the claim; however, the lower
court's judgment was reversed on appeal.193 The appellate court
ruled that the allegations against Verizon were sufficient to claim
monopolization under the Sherman Act on the basis of the doc-
trine of "essential facilities" (The court did not decide whether
the "local loop" was indeed an essential facility, leaving this to be
determined at first instance). 9 4 The case was then brought
before the Supreme Court. 195
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Verizon.' 96 Six jus-
tices signed a majority opinion that found that compelling firms
- even monopolies - to share their property risked reducing
innovation and economic growth. 19 7 The monopolist would
have little incentive to invest if it had to share the results with its
competitors, and the competitors would have little incentive if
187. See id. at 1212-14.
188. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398 (2004).
189. See id. at 402.
190. See id. at 402-04.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 404-05.
193. See id.
194. See id. at 410.
195. See id. at 405.
196. See id. at 410.
197. See id. at 407-08.
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they could piggyback on the monopolist. 198 The opinion noted
that the Supreme Court had never previously recognized the
doctrine of essential facilities, and saw no need either to recog-
nize or to repudiate it in the context of the case at hand.1 99 The
justices also expressed doubt that courts could identify the ex-
ceptions when forced sharing might make sense. 20 0 They wor-
ried that courts would turn into "central planners" that would
have to dictate price, quantity, and the other terms of deals be-
tween rivals. 2 1  Three other justices also agreed that Verizon
should prevail but on standing grounds that did not necessitate,
in their minds, addressing the merit issues examined by the ma-
jority.20 2
The Supreme Court in Trinko also distinguished its contro-
versial decision in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.
in which it affirmed that a three-mountain ski resort had violated
the antitrust laws by refusing to continue to make lift tickets
available to a competing one-mountain resort.20 3 It said that
Aspen Skiing was "at or near the boundary" of when it would find
an obligation to deal.2 4 The linchpin of the violation there, the
Court said, was that the dominant ski resort refused to sell its
rivals tickets at retail prices - an action that could lead one to
believe that it was foregoing current profits for the purpose of
securing a monopoly and the ability to recoup its losses later
through higher prices.20 5 The Supreme Court also distinguished
the famous United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis20 6 case
as well as Associated Press v. United States"°7 on the grounds that
those cases involved concerted action by several competitors to
deny others access to an important facility.2 8
In summary, therefore, while the U.S. courts have recog-
nized that a refusal to deal can in certain circumstances consti-
198. See id.
199. See id. at 411.
200. See id. at 407-08.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 416-18 (Stevens, J., concurring).
203. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 606-10
(1985).
204. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.
205. See id.
206. 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
207. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
208. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410 & n.3.
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tute anticompetitive conduct, the approach of the Supreme
Court has been "very cautious in recognizing such exceptions,
because of the uncertain virtue of forced sharing and the diffi-
culty of identifying and remedying anticompetitive conduct by a
single firm. 2 °9
C. Comparing the EU and U.S. Approaches
Although the EU and U.S. both have high hurdles for find-
ing an obligation to deal, they are different hurdles and come
from somewhat different perspectives on the role of competition
law. U.S. law does not consider a refusal to license IP an anti-
trust violation by itself.210 It does not become a violation just
because it prevents the emergence of a new product or other-
wise satisfies the Magill and IMS Health conditions. 211 It must in-
stead be implicated by other actions taken by the owner of the
IP.21 2 In Kodak, the Appeals Court found that the defendant was
trying to monopolize the photocopying service market through a
series of illegitimate actions and that Kodak's invocation of its IP
rights was a pretext.2 1 3 More generally, in Trinko, the Supreme
Court noted that the refusal to deal in Aspen Ski was deemed an
antitrust violation because it could only be explained as part of
an anticompetitive strategy to drive a rival from business.2 1 4 In-
stead, EC law is willing to entertain the possibility that a refusal
to license IP is an antitrust violation by itself.215
That said, there are important parallels between the EC and
U.S. law on refusal to license IP rights in practice. The courts in
the EU and the U.S. have been highly reluctant to override an
owner's IP rights. 216 Both have recognized that ex ante incentives
for investment and innovation generally outweigh the ex post
209. Id. at 408.
210. See id. at 410.
211. See id.; see contra Magill,Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, [1995] E.C.R.
1-743; see also IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-
418/01, [2004] E.C.R. -, (ECJ Apr. 29, 2004) (2004 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 192).
212. See, e.g., Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195,
1219-21 (9th Cir. 1997).
213. See id.
214. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.
215. See Magill, [1995] E.C.R. 1-743; see also IMS Health, [2004] E.C.R. _, (ECJ Apr.
29, 2004) (2004 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 192).
216. See, e.g., Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407-08; Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v.
Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-7/97, [1998]
E.C.R. 1-7791.
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benefits of increased supply by additional competitors.2 17 The
EU and U.S. courts have imposed compulsory licensing as an
antitrust remedy in two cases - Magill in the EU and Kodak in
the U.S., both of which involved extreme and "exceptional cir-
cumstances."2 18
The parallel is less clear outside the realm of IP. 219 In fact
Trinko concerned physical property - the local loop - and not
IP, and yet, in its assessment, the Supreme Court took on board
the same sort of ex ante incentive effects that characterize the
judgments on refusal to license IP on both sides of the Atlan-
tic. 220 This is not the case in Europe. The conditions for
mandatory access in Bronner - the leading refusal to deal EC
case involving physical property - do not include the new prod-
uct condition in Magill and IMS Health.2 1 And even though Ad-
vocate-General Jacobs considered at length the disincentive ef-
fects on investment in physical infrastructures of forced access in
his much celebrated opinion, the Court has not yet endorsed
those views in a case. 2
2 2
VII. CONCLUSION
Most successful modern economies have adopted policies
that recognize that strong IP rights are needed to provide ex ante
incentives for innovation that will raise standards of living in the
long run. Hundreds of books and economic studies affirm the
soundness of these policies. 22 ' The economic literature also em-
phasizes the role of competition as an engine of growth.2 4 Yet,
some observers see conflict between the promotion of competi-
tion and the protection of IP, i.e., between the antitrust and IP
217. See id.
218. See Magill, [1995] E.C.R. 1-743; see also Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1225-26.
219. "For the purpose of antitrust analysis, the [U.S. Department of Justice] re-
gards intellectual property . . . as being essentially comparable to any other form of
tangible or intangible property." U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDE-
LINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 17, at 64 (1995).
220. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407-08.
221. See Bronner, [1998] E.C.R. 1-7791.
222. See id.
223. See, e.g., WILLIAMJ. BAUMOL, THE FREE MARKET INNOVATION MACHINE (2002);
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RicHARD A. POSNER, THE EcONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW (2003); and references therein,
224. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EUROPEAN COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2004
(2004), and references therein.
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laws.2 25 The goal of IP laws is to promote innovation, and they
do so by granting temporary monopoly power. The antitrust
laws seek to promote competition and curb market power.
Generally, however, there is no tension. The antitrust laws
do not condemn monopolies for the very same reason that the
IP laws protect IP rights. European competition laws only pro-
hibit monopolies from abusing their position in certain ways
deemed harmful,2 26 and the U.S. laws only prohibit obtaining or
maintaining monopolies through means other than IP rights,
scale economies, merit based competition reflecting superior
skills, enhanced efficiency, and sheer luck.227 There is a possible
exception though. Courts on both sides of the Atlantic have
found an antitrust violation when a firm refuses to license its IP
rights. 228 This is deemed an abuse for which the remedy is com-
pulsory licensing.229 It is a controversial exception because it
places the antitrust laws in the position of explicitly taking away
something the IP laws have bestowed. 2 0 Thus far, the U.S. and
European courts have found that a refusal to license an IP right
is an antitrust violation only in "exceptional circumstances." 23 1
In this Article we have shown that this analogous approach
of high, albeit different, hurdles for compulsory licensing by
American and European courts constitutes sound competition
policy, as it implements the optimal legal standard for assessing
refusals to license - one that maximizes long run consumer wel-
fare by minimizing the expected cost of errors resulting from
condemning welfare-increasing practices and from condoning
welfare-reducing ones. The "balancing test" adopted by the
225. See generallyJames Rill et al., The Antitrust and IP Interface in the U.S. and
EU, Competition Law 2003/04, Global Counsel Handbooks, available at http://www.
howrey.com/docs/IPlnterfaceUSEU.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2005) (discussing the rela-
tionships between IP and antitrust law in both the United States and the European
Union).
226. See RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAw (5th ed. 2003).
227. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
228. See Magill, joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, [1995] E.C.R. 1-743; see also
Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1225-26 (9th Cir.
1997).
229. See Magill, [1995] E.C.R. 1-743; see also Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1225-26.
230. "[U]nilateral refusal to license cases ... cut to the heart of the intellectual
property owner's right to exclude others from practicing the intellectual property."
Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Unilateral Refusals to License (2004) (conference paper
adapted from Herbert Hovenkamp et al., IP and Antitrust (2004)).
231. See Magill, [1995] E.C.R. 1-743; see also Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1225-26.
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Commission in Microsoft, therefore, represents a disconcerting
new development, as it will lead to too many and too costly false
convictions.
We have also argued that a similar approach should be ap-
plied to the assessment of unilateral refusals to provide access to
physical infrastructure or to any other tangible or intangible
property. And yet, while the EU approach to compulsory licens-
ing is closely aligned with that followed by the U.S. courts, the
Atlantic consensus on the treatment of refusals to deal appears
to be weaker outside the realm of IP.
From a European perspective, this Article gives rise to two
principal policy recommendations. First, it cautions against the
adoption of an "entirety of the circumstances" approach to the
assessment of refusals to license IP. A case-by-case test, like the
Commission's test in Microsoft, constitutes, in the context of IP
refusals, an invitation to error. Second, it suggests that ex-
tending the application of the "exceptional circumstances test"
in Magill and IMS Health, including the new product screen, to
refusal to deal cases involving physical property would likely con-
stitute appropriate public policy.
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